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War Through Pharmaceuticals:
How Terrorist Organizations are
Turning to Counterfeit Medicine
to Fund Their Illicit Activity
Douglas T. Cannon 1
The current international framework is ill equipped to
proactively handle the growing threat terror organizations play
on the international pharmaceutical industry. Globally, there
lacks a true enforcement mechanism that can both proactively
thwart these offenses, but also retroactively prosecute the
offenders. Our typical image of terrorism is a group of masked
men opening fire on a crowded area, or detonating improvised
explosive devices to harm hundreds or thousands of innocent
civilians. But what if terrorists became so advanced that they
were able to harm millions, without their targets ever knowing?
Imagine taking over-the-counter pain medication to relieve your
horrible sinus pressure, but unbeknownst to you, that medicine
had been tainted with Cyanide. While that example is horribly
graphic—it is a real example of what many call a chilling display
of domestic terrorism. Similarly, what if that generic Viagra
being sold was secretly produced by Hizballah and used to
finance its ongoing terror operations globally. Experts have
warned the pharmaceutical industry that they are vulnerable to
terror threats, little has pragmatically been done. This Note
proposes a new International Task Force, which will have both
the authority to seek out these offenders, use force – if neededto take down these groups, a database to organize this
information, and finally, a Treaty establishing counterfeit
medicine as a crime. While many Notes detail international
responses to terrorism, or global responses to pharmaceuticals,
no Note has yet to combine the two very real issues. Providing
exposure to this issue, this Note will provide for a unique plan
to impede these offenders.
“The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” – Thomas Jefferson

1.

Managing Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law;
B.A., Washington & Jefferson College (2012); J.D. Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (expected 2015).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the post-9/11 world, terrorist groups are becoming ever more
resourceful in discovering novel techniques to increase funding. 2 One
such way is the manufacturing and distributing of counterfeit drugs.3
As one author noted, “[c]ounterfeiting is a serious problem that
transcends law enforcement…and clearly has entered the realm of
terrorism.” 4 While others have written about how terror groups
finance their operations vis-à-vis the exchange of narcotics, this Note
2.

See Matthew Levitt, Political Hardball Within Hamas: Hardline
Militants Calling Shots in Gaza, WASH. INST. (Jan. 6, 2009), http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/political-hardballwithin-hamas-hardline-militants-calling-shots-in-gaza.

3.

See Hezbollah Tries to Use Counterfeit Medications as a Terrorist
Weapon, MISSING PEACE (Jun. 3, 2013), http://missingpeace.eu/ en/
2013/06/hezbollah-tries-to-use-counterfeit-medications-as-a-terroristweapon/.

4.

Jay Fraser, Counterfeiting—A Matter of National Security, THREATS
WATCH, http:// threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/05/counterfeiting-amatter-of-nat/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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will focus on the illegal production, and sale of pharmaceutical
medication, commonly referred to as “Counterfeit Medicine.” 5 As part
of the larger issue of counterfeiting, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) in 2006 launched the International Medical Products AntiCounterfeiting Taskforce (“IMPACT”) to “build coordinated
networks across and between countries in [o]rder to halt the
production, trading and selling of fake medicines around the globe.” 6
In analyzing the issue of Counterfeit Medicine, its funding of
terror, and IMPACT’s mission, it is first important to understand
how terror financing has changed in the last decade. Accordingly,
Part II of this Note provides a background of this issue, focusing on
the terror aspects as they relate to counterfeit medicine. This section
focuses on well-known terror groups and their methods of funding. In
addition, this section lays the framework for an analysis in the final
section detailing a method of preventing these groups from using
counterfeit medicine to further proliferate their terror activity. Part
III analyzes the current framework of counterfeit medicine. It explores
which markets have been affected; who, in the international
community, has the authority to act, and who is acting. Part III
analyzes the efficacy of the United States government and other
countries’ task forces in combatting counterfeit medicine, as well as
the WHO and their unit- IMPACT. Finally, Part IV provides a
critique and a discussion of a possible solution to combating this
problem: instituting an international anti-counterfeiting task force
akin to the International Anti-Poaching Foundation.

5.

See Counterfeit Medicine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicin
eSafely/CounterfeitMedicine/default.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)
(defining counterfeit medicine as “fake medicine[, that] may be
contaminated or contain the wrong or no active ingredient. They
could have the right active ingredient but at the wrong dose.
Counterfeit drugs are illegal and may be harmful to [one’s] health.”).

6.

IMPACT: International Medicine Products Anti-Counterfeiting
Taskforce, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/impact/about/
en/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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II. BACKGROUND- TERROR GROUPS, THEIR FUNDING, AND
COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE
Terrorism is defined as “the use of violence and threats to
intimidate or coerce.” 7 While terrorism is not a recent phenomenon,
largely, since the 1980s it has threatened Western existence. 8 In
modernity, terrorism has greatly evolved into complex organizations
fighting for a common cause. While there is yet to be an organization
focused solely on counterfeiting medicine, many current terror
organizations have dabbled in this area. The following provides
background into the designation of a terror group, how they receive
funding, and how these designation’s and funding factors relate to
counterfeit medicine.
A. Terror Groups—A Primer

The U.S. Department of State champions a list of policy
determinations and classifications defining a Foreign Terror
Organization (“FTO”). 9 In this capacity, the Secretary of State, in
accordance with §219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) designates the group(s) to be added to this list. 10 Section 219
of the INA states that for an organization to be listed:
7.

Terrorism, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
terrorism (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).

8.

See generally J.M.B. Porter, Osama bin Laden, Jihād, and the Sources
of International Terrorism, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 871, 876
(explaining how in Osama Bin Laden’s view, the Christian Crusades
were no different than Islamic terror of today).

9.

See Office of The Coordinator For Counterterrorism, Chapter 6. Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, U.S. STATE DEP’T., http://www.state.gov/
j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). It is worth
noting that the FTO is not the only list that the U.S. government
employs in its aim to define terror organizations. See e.g., section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j) et seq.,
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/index.html. In
addition to the lists the U.S. government employs, there is a multitude
of lists compiled by the international community. See e.g., S.C. Res
1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390
(Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003).
For a list of individuals and organizations classified by the EU as terror
organizations see L 340/64 23.12.2005, available at http://eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_340/l_34020051223en0064006
6.pdf.

10.

See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8; see also INA: Act
219—Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMM. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ ilink/docView/
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1.It must be a foreign organization.
2.The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined
in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),
or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3.The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security
(national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of
the United States. 11

Currently, according to the Department of State, there are over
forty-five groups listed. 12 These groups include, Hizballah, 13 Abu
Sayyaf Group, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qa’ida (and their derivations) as well
as non-Islamic groups such as the Real IRA. 14 Both Hizballah and the
Real IRA have been linked to counterfeiting medicine, and as such, a
brief history of each will be explored. 15

SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-5017.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2015) [hereinafter INA Act 219].
11.

See INA Act 219, supra note 9.

12.

The State Department updates the list of foreign terror organizations
yearly, and changes are additionally made as Congress updates its
statutes. Organizations can challenge their FTO designation by filing a
petition for revocation two years after the designation date (or in the
case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or two
years after the determination date on its most recent petition for
revocation. The moving party, to successfully overcome this challenge,
must provide material evidence that the basis for the FTO designation
warrants such a removal of said designation. Additionally, if no
challenge is made within five years of placing an organization on the
FTO list, the Secretary of State is required to conduct a review to
determine the appropriateness of the designation. See Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §
1011(a), 118 Stat. 3638.; see Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra
note 8 (at the time of writing this Note, Department of State lists 49
groups as TFO).

13.

Hizballah is also commonly referred to as Hezbollah.

14.

See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8 (at the time of
writing this Note, Department of State lists 49 groups as FTO).

15.

NICHOLAS RIDLEY, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE FAILURE OF COUNTER
MEASURES 127 (2012); see also Hezbollah Tries to Use Counterfeit
Medications as a Terrorist Weapon, MISSING PEACE, http://
missingpeace. eu/ en/ 2013/ 06/ hezbollah-tries-to-use-counterfeitmedications-as-a-terrorist-weapon (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
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1. Hizballah

Hizballah received its FTO designation in October of 1997. 16 The
Department of State characterizes Hizballah as a radical Shia based
group, which takes its ideological inspiration from the Ayotollah
Kohmeini. 17 Hizballah is often termed the “long arm of Iran.” 18 Most
recently, the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicted members of
Hizballah for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq alHariri, killed by a car bomb in Beirut in 2005. 19
2. Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA)

The Real IRA received its FTO designation in May of 2001 after
forming in 1997 with the express purpose of “removing British forces
from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland.” 20 Located in Northern
Ireland, the Real IRA is a paramilitary group whose purpose is to
reunite “Ireland’s 32 counties under an independent Republic of
Ireland.” 21 It is now believed the RIRA is splintering, focusing more
on soft targets while attempting to regroup. 22 Most recently, in March
2013, local authorities foiled an attempted mortar attack by RIRA.23
16.

See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8.

17.

Id.

18.

See Iran & Hezbollah Axis of Terror—A Worldwide Threat, IDF BLOG
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.idfblog.com/hezbollah/2013/10/08/iranhezbollah-axis-terror-worldwide-threat/; see also Attila Somflavi,
Official: Hezbollah Attack More Dangerous than Iran Missiles, YNET
NEWS (Jun. 8, 2012), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4265026,00.html.

19.

See Leena Saidi and David Stout, Huge Car Bomb Kills Lebanon’s
Former Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/02/14/international/14cnd-beirut.html;
see
also
Martin Chulov, UN Court Indicts Four Hezbollah Members Over Hariri
Car Bomb, GUARDIAN (Jun. 30, 2011) http://www. theguardian.
com/world/2011/jun/30/lebanon-indicts-hezbollah-hariri-car-bomb; see
also The Prosecutor v. Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Salim Jamil Ayyash,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi & Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-1101/I/PTJ, Indictment (Jun. 10, 2011), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/thecases/stl-11-01/main/filings/indictments/f0007.

20.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 8.

21.

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), START: NAT’L. CONSORTIUM FOR
STUDY TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM , http:// www. start.
umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp
?id=91 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)

22.

Id.; Compare, e.g., Scott Stewart, The Persistent Threat to Soft
Targets, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (Jul. 26, 2012), http://
www.stratfor.com/weekly/persistent-threat-soft-targets.

23.

Chris Buckler, Londonderry Mortar Bomb Attack Averted, BBC (Mar.
4, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21656775.
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B. Terrorist Financing

The prevention of terrorist financing since 9/11 has proved to be
quite daunting. 24 One reason is that some of these funds are smuggled
via legitimate business networks and charities. 25 The U.S. government
is adamant about “starving the terrorists of funding and shutting
down the institutions that support or facilitate terrorism.” 26 As of
2005, the U.S. government has frozen nearly $200 million in terrorist
funds, though over 80% were frozen the first few months after 9/11.27
Since this time, the U.S., in concert with 36 other countries, organized
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (“FATF”). 28
The prime directive of FATF is to adopt a uniform set of standards
regarding money laundering and terrorist financing, that encourage an
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures
for these actions which pose a threat to our financial systems.29
24.

Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and
United States, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2006); see also MARTIN A.
WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21902, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE
9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 3 (2005).

25.

John Roth et. al, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing 4, available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Mon
ograph.pdf; see also Judith Miller and Jeff Gerth, A Nation Challenged:
Al Qaeda; Hone Trade Said to Provide Funds and Cover to bin Laden,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/11/
world/nation-challenged-al-qaeda-honey-trade-said-provide-funds-coverbin-laden.html (stating that American officials have evidence that AQ’s
$ is coming from shops that sell honey); see also Amelia Hill, Bin
Laden’s $20m African ‘Blood Diamond’ Deals, GUARDIAN (Oct. 19,
2012) http://www.theguardian.com /world/ 2002/ oct/20/ alqaida.
terrorism.

26.

Statement of Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill on Signing of Executive
Order Authorizing the Treasury Department to Block Funds of
Terrorists and their Associates, (Sept. 24, 2001).

27.

WEISS, supra note 23, at 1.

28.

The FATF members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, People’s Republic of China, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States; the two
international organizations are the European Commission, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council. There are also an array of international
organizations and countries with “observer status.” For more
information see FATF Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK
FORCE (2014), http:// www. fatf-gafi. org/ pages/ aboutus/
membersandobservers/.

29.

Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare/.
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Though lacking an enforcement mechanism, countries voluntarily
agree to the following conditions, promulgated by FATF, in order to
receive membership:
(1) [B]e fully committed at the political level to implement the
40 recommendations within a reasonable time frame (three
years) and to undergo annual self-assessment exercises and two
rounds of mutual evaluations; (2) be a full and active member
of the relevant FATF-style regional body; (3) be a strategically
important country; (4) have already made the laundering of the
proceeds of drug trafficking and other serious crimes a criminal
offense; and (5) have already made it mandatory for financial
institutions to identify their customers and to report unusual or
suspicious transactions. 30

The recommendations of FATF have been adopted by the UN,31
and affirmed by the G-20 in their annual conferences located in
Pittsburgh, Seoul, and Cannes. 32 While unable to actively enforce
their regulations—due to a lack of proper regulating body, and no
true enforcement mechanism—FATF has made meaningful progress
since its inception. 33
Before delving into how this illicit money is raised, and what is
being done to thwart that fundraising, it is prudent to understand
what the money raised is used for, and just how little money is truly
needed to organize and create the chaos on which these organizations
thrive, thus exhibiting the great impact the sale of counterfeit
medicine has. 34 The funding of terrorist organizations can generally be
categorized into two general categories: operational costs, and
organizational costs. 35
30.

JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21904, THE FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE: AN OVERVIEW 1.

31.

See S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (Jul. 29, 2005).

32.

See generally Cannes Summit Final Declaration—Building on Our
Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All,
UNIV. TORONTO G20 INFO. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html
[hereinafter G-20 Cannes].

33.

Jackson, supra note 29, at 4 (showing that since its inception, only two
countries have been deemed “non-cooperative countries” [North Korea
and Iran] and sixteen countries where progress is still needed to meet
the mutual cooperativeness FATF seeks [Cuba, Bolivia, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, and Turkey]).

34.

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING 4 (2008) at 4, available
at http:// www.fatf-gafi.org/ media/ fatf/ documents/ reports/
FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf.

35.

Id at 7.
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1. Operational Costs

The amount of money needed to carry out an attack varies based
on a multitude of factors, some of which include: location, method,
and personnel. An indication of the estimated costs of attacks can be
detailed in the following table:

Analyzing the table, it is apparent that the relative cost of
financing a terror operation is quite low vis-à-vis the yield for injury.36
In just two attacks, the infamous London Tube and Madrid Train
bombings, nearly 2400 individuals were injured, and over 210 lost
their lives. 37 Counter that figure with the combined expenditure to
carry out the attack, roughly a mere $14,00038 and it is quite apparent
why tracking and stopping these small monetary operations becomes
quite tricky. 39 Other operational costs include per diems to the
martyrs, communication protocols, and training. 40 Quantifying
36.

Compare
e.g.
7
July
Bombings,
BBC
NEWS
(2011),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_hap
pened/html/russell_sq.stm (claiming 26 deaths and 340 injuries) with
The Ruling Excludes ETA Condems Zougam Trashorras and El-Gnaoui
and acquits “The Egyptian,” LA VERDAD, http://especiales.
laverdad.es/juicio-11m/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (asserting that 192
casualties and 2050 injuries); see also Indictment of Spanish Bombers,
Sumario N 20/2004 (Jul. 5, 2006) available at http://
www.elmundo.es/documentos/2006/04/11/auto_11m.html.

37.

See 7 July Bombings, supra note 36; see LA VERDAD, supra note 26.

38.

See 2005 FX Daily Forex Rates U.S. Dollar £ GBP € Euro, TAX FREE
GOLD http://taxfreegold.co.uk/2005forexrates.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).

39.

See Robin Finn, Cutting Off Terror’s Money Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2007, at B4 (comparing going after the small money operations to
“trying to shut down the phone company by going to people’s homes
and apartments and individually smashing their phones instead of
destroying the satellites and cables that conduct the signals.”)

40.

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 33 at 8.

351

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
War Through Pharmaceuticals

training to expense per operation can be quite perplexing.41
Quantifying an exact amount is nearly impossible, though it may be
less than one would think if groups with similar ideologies share the
brunt of expenses. 42
2. Organizational Costs

Beyond the assumed costs of running a clandestine operation,
recruitment, planning, and procurement represent the largest tranche
of necessary financial resources. 43 Take, for example, Hamas. Hamas
has a tripartite structure composed of a social welfare branch, a
political branch, and a military division. 44 Funding for these
operations can be quite burdensome. 45 While some of the military
division’s costs can be accounted for under the operational category,
such as guerilla and terrorist activities, the public face of the Hamas,
though formally a FTO, engenders many other expenses. Roughly
50% of Hamas’ annual budget (nearly $450 million) is dedicated to
these operating expenses. 46 While Hamas stands as an outlier 47- it is
estimated that Hizballah’s operating budget is around $200-$500
million with roughly $100 million coming from the Iranian
government. 48 Further, as of 2011, the Taliban was estimated to take
in approximately $560 million annually, 49 and the UN revealed that
41.

See TERRORIST FIN. STAFF, NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
U.S., AL QAEDA’S MEANS AND METHODS TO RAISE, MOVE, AND USE
MONEY 19,
available
at
http://govinfo.library. unt.edu/911/
staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch2.pdf
(estimating
overhead
at
approximately $30m for all).

42.

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 33 at 8.

43.

Id.

44.

Levitt, supra note 1.

45.

See Omar Shaban, Hamas Budget a Small Step Toward Transparency,
AL-MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/
iw/contents/articles/opinion/2013/01/hamas-budget-transparency.html
(noting that until 2007 funding of Hamas equaled roughly $4-5m per
month).

46.

Id.

47.

Besides being a radical terror organization, Hamas is also the controlling
government in the Gaza Strip. See Gaza Strip, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
gz.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).

48.

THE
NETWORK,
http://www.
See
Hezbollah,
DISCOVER
discoverthenetworks.org/printgroupProfile.asp?grpid=6256 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2014).

49.

See The World’s 5 Richest Terrorist Groups, MONEY JIHAD,
http://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2011/08/29/the-worlds-5-richestterrorist-groups/ (Aug. 29, 2011).
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$70-$100 million is approximately al-Shabaab’s revenues. 50 Compare
those figures with estimates recently from Forbes, and other outlets,
that estimate al Qaeda is actually bankrupt. 51 Due to continued
constraints on its funding pipeline by the U.S. and allies, “al Qaeda’s
home office [is] no longer able to subsidize operations.” 52
3. How Do Terrorists Finance Their Operations?

Unlike normal businesses, terror organizations do not have the
luxury of simply using earned income, or revenue, to finance their
counterfeiting operations directly. This is due to a few reasons, the
last of which is United States Federal banking law. 53 Instead, there
are two main categories that define how terror groups fundraise:
moving money, and earning money. This section will analyze the ways
in which terror organizations move and earn their money.
a. Moving Money

The process in which terrorists, or other nefarious persons, turn
dirty/tainted money—obtained from their less than legal activities—
into “clean” usable money is known as laundering. 54
Terrorists launder ‘clean’ money by moving and storing it for
the purposes of financing training and future operations. The
lack of physical evidence in mobile transactions, and the ability
to easily move and store money through various New Payment
Methods, should be of great concern to the law enforcement
community. 55

There are a few forms of “moving money” that the terror
organizations can employ. A classical Islamic law, dating back to the
50.

See Barbara Starr, U.N. Report: Al-Shabaab is Raising Millions Illegally
in Somalia, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/ WORLD/ africa/
08/05/somalia.al.shabaab.report/ (Aug. 5, 2011).

51.

See Nathan Vardi, Is Al-Qaeda Bankrupt?, FORBES http://
www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0301/terrorism-funds-finance-osama-alqaeda-bankrupt.html (Feb. 21, 2010); see also Bruce Watson, Is Al
Qaeda Bankrupt? Authorities Cripple Group by Cutting Off Money
Supply, DAILYFINANCE, http://www.dailyfinance.com/ 2010/02/14/
authorities-are-crippling-al-qaeda-by-cutting-off-its-money-supp/ (Feb.
14, 2010); Compare with Stephen Gandel, Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt
al-Qaeda?, TIME, http://business.time.com/ 2011/05/02/will-osamasdeath-bankrupt-al-qaeda/ (May 2, 2011).

52.

Vardi, supra note 51.

53.

See 18 U.S.C § 1956.

54.

See Jenni Hesterman, Mobile Payments a New Way for Terrorists and
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
Criminals
to
Move
Money,
IN
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/mobile_payments_a_new_way_for/.

55.

Id.
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8th century, dictates a form of transferring money known as Hawala.56
Formally, “Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system”
which operates outside, or occasionally parallel to traditional western
banking systems. 57 What makes Hawala so difficult to track and
prevent is the complicated manner in which Hawala transactions
occur. There are no receipts, the bookkeeping is in aggregate, not in
terms of individual remittances, and while money changes hands
domestically, the passing of funds internationally is not quite as
obvious. 58 In many cases, the money does not need to transfer from
broker to fulfiller as the fulfiller can be simply repaying a current
debt. 59 Because of these “off the book” dealings, tracking is near
impossible unless wiretaps are used or tracking systems are in place to
monitor couriers. As such, a key attractiveness to Hawala is
anonymity. 60 Since 9/11, the United States and other governments
have been on particularly high alert for illicit trading via Hawala
networks, in some cases shutting down networks, and/or issuing
sanctions, or advisory statements. 61 But, while many Western
countries are increasingly suspicious of Hawala transactions, a large
portion of the Western world still allows for Hawala transactions. 62
With the increased prevalence of new and novel payment
methods, at least one analyst believes “[w]e do not have another year
to waste.” 63 In the digital age, it is increasingly difficult to “follow the

56.

See Patrick M. Jost, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its
Role in Money Laundering, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/
Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf at 15.

57.

Id at 5.

58.

Id at 7.

59.

Id.

60.

Id at 9. For a more thorough examination of the ramifications of Hawala
in regards to money laundering see id. at 12–13.

61.

See United States v. Banki, 2010 WL 1459442 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2010)
(analyzing whether Hawala transactions to Iran violated U.S. sanctions
against Iran); see also Informal Value Transfer Systems, FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Sept. 1, 2010), http:// www.fincen.gov/
statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2010-A011.html,
(examining
the
issues with Hawala or informal value transfer systems).

62.

See e.g., WORLD BANK & INT’L MONETARY FUND, INFORMAL FUNDS
TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL HAWALA SYSTEM
33-40 (2003) (explaining the variety of countries which regulate,
administrate, and ban Hawala financing).

63.

See Rachel Ehrenfeld & John Wood, How Terrorists Send Money,
UNITED PRESS INT’L, http:// www. spacewar. com/ reports/
How_Terrorists_Send_Money_999.html.
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money[,]” when these m-payments are used. 64 This gives terrorists and
illicit
financiers
a
remarkable
advantage. 65
Technological
advancements have made constricting the channels of illicit banking
increasingly difficult. Take for example, mobile payment systems.66
Recently, Square, a mobile payment aggregator, released a product
called Square Cash. 67 The technology allows users to seamlessly
transfer money using an app or email. 68 While still requiring a debit
card, no further information is needed. 69 While mobile payment
systems 70 “M-payment” is not new, it is presenting additional
challenges to governments, regulators, law enforcement, as well as the
M-payment industry in regards to delivering a safe payment system
while limiting the threat of money laundering, and criminal/terrorist
activity. 71 In March of 2008, the U.S. Department of State issued a
statement detailing mobile payments and their increased threat for
64.

See Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement Aff., Mobile
Payments—A Growing Threat, U.S. STATE DEP’T (Mar. 2008),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol2/html/101346.htm
[hereinafter Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep.]. For a further
explanation of “m-payments” see generally H. Paul Leyva, J.D., MPayment: A Threat to Anti-Money Laundering, VT. B.J., Fall 2008, at
62, 63

65.

Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep., supra note 64 ; see also Angela
Angelovska-Wilson; Jaimie, Feltault, M-Payments: The Next Payment
Frontier—Current Developments and Challenges in International
Implementation of M-Payments, 8 J. INT’L BANK. L. & REG. 575, 575-93
(2007) (detailing m-payments)

66.

See e.g. Salvador Rodriguez, Square Cash for Sending Money: How It
Stacks Up Against Rivals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://
www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-square-cash-comparison20131016,0,2453599.story#axzz2kIKLJTBg (showcasing various mobile
payment systems).

67.

Square is a merchant services aggregator—also known as purchase
aggregator—and mobile payment software developer and hardware
producer. Square’s products are used in a range of small to midsize
boutiques. For more information on Square and its products, see
SQUARE, https://squareup.com.

68.

Id.

69.

Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep., supra note 64.

70.

Jenni Hesterman, Mobile Payments a New Way for Terrorists and
Criminals to Move Money, IN HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 27, 2008),
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/mobile_payments_a_new_way_for/
(defining mobile payments or m-payments as “point-of-sale cash
transactions made through a mobile device such as cell phone or
personal data assistant.”).

71.

See John A. Cassara, How M-Payments Might Be the Global Miney
Laundering Machine of Criminals’ Dreams, SAS (Jun. 17, 2013),
http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/m-paymentsmachine-criminals-dreams.html.
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terror activity. 72 It is estimated that the remittances of global mobile
payment exceed two hundred and fifty billion dollars annually. 73 With
the prevalence of these mobile payment systems, proceeds of crime or
contributions to terrorist organizations can now be transmitted via
mobile or wireless networks. Due to these transfers, nefarious groups
and individuals avoid the risk of physical cash movement, thus
bypassing financial reporting requirements, and gaining an advantage
via the swift remittance of currency across a country or around the
world. 74
b. Earning Money

To fund the activities of a terror organization, money comes from
a variety of avenues. 75 Three leading categories are front companies,
charities, and illegal activity. 76 Front companies are legitimate
business owned and operated for legitimate purposes, but their
proprietors or investors often are nefarious individuals. 77 Charities at
one point were the largest source of terrorist funding and the “funds
transferred to terrorists are often raised legally and only acquire their
relationship to terrorist financing through subsequent money
laundering.” 78 In the Islamic world alone there are thousands of
charities, though it is estimated the funding is channeled through a
few hundred. 79 Many terror organizations raise funds with the express
intent of supporting terrorists; while others seek to promote their
religion – Islam – through legitimate programs, but are coopted by
jihadists who subsequently consume the funds to promote their own
radical cause. 80 Further illustrating this point is the case of Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development. 81 In July of 2004, the U.S.
72.

Int’l Narcotics Control Strat. Rep., supra note 64.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

See Eben Kaplan, Tracking Down Terrorist Financing, COUNCIL FOR.
REL. (Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-financing/trackingdown-terrorist-financing/p10356.

76.

Id.

77.

See id. at 2 (explaining how Osama Bin Laden allegedly owned a “string
of retail honey shops throughout the Middle East and Pakistan” which,
among selling honey, was “used to conceal shipments of money and
weapons.”); see also WEISS, supra note 23, at 3.

78.

WEISS, supra note 23 at 3. see also Kaplan, supra note 75, at 2.

79.

Kaplan, supra note 75 at 2.

80.

Id.

81.

See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised
(Dec. 27, 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 525, 184 L. Ed. 2d 338 (U.S.
2012) and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 525 (U.S. 2012)
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government indicted Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development, the largest Muslim charity in the United States, for
providing financial support to Hamas. 82 Its leaders were accused of
materially supporting a FTO, among other charges. 83 The charity’s
assets were frozen shortly after the 9/11 attacks. 84 Allegedly, over $57
million in donations had been sent to “Hamas-controlled organizations
and programs in the West Bank and Gaza.” Further substantiating
the naivety upon donors, the charities donors asserted a lack of
knowledge as to the claim that their contributions were being diverted
to terrorism.
C. Terrorism and Counterfeit Medicine

One of the principal features in the U.S. War On Terror
(“WOT”) is the Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”). This “Task
Force” is a fairly recent phenomenon where the FBI and participating
agencies act in concert to either thwart attacks or solve cases. 85 The
JTTF, is comprised of over 682 State, Federal, and Local agencies.86
In 2006, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”) indicted nineteen
individuals in Detroit that were tied to a cartel whose principal
purpose was fundraising for the Lebanese terrorist organization
Hizballah. 87 Historically, much of the focus for these cartels has been
linked to cigarettes 88 and other goods. 89 Similarly, in 2010, Lebanese
police uncovered a medical counterfeiting operation in Lebanon, run
by Hizballah. 90 It is estimated that from this cartel alone, over “10

82.

See Laurence Arnold, Holy Land, a Muslim Charity, Accused of Aiding
Terror, BLOOMBERG, http:// www. bloomberg. com/ apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXJstxtVhcZ8 (July 27, 2004).

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

See The Joint Terrorism Task Force andNational Joint Terrorism Task
Force,
NJTTF,
http://www.
gwumc.
edu/
hspi/
policy/
NJTTF%20Outreach%20Brief.pdf.

86.

For a detailed list see Id. at p. 10.

87.

See Nineteen Charged With Racketeering to Support Terrorist
Organization, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/nineteen-charged-with-racketeering-to-supportterrorist-organization-70737752.html.

88.

Id. See also United States v. Hammoud, 483 F. App’x 865, 866 (4th Cir.
2012) (sentencing Hammoud to 155 years for selling contraband
cigarettes and providing the windfall of such to Hezbollah.)

89.

See Jay Fraser, Counterfeiting—A Matter of National Security, CTR.
THREAT AWARENESS THREAT WATCH (May 12, 2008), http://
threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/05/counterfeiting-a-matter-of-nat/.

FOR

90.

Missing Peace, supra note 2.
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tons of hazardous pills” have flooded the market, and Hizballah has
benefitted in the range of “hundreds of millions of dollars.” 91
“Illegal drug trafficking and terrorism cannot be viewed as a
victimless crime.” 92 In South America, despite decade’s worth of
attempts to thwart its growth, “the production and trafficking of
popular
illicit
drugs—cocaine,
marijuana,
opiates,
and
methamphetamine” creates a multi-billion dollar illicit market.93
Amongst the facilitation, promulgation, and production of illegal
drugs and their use, these markets, and the cartels within, create the
nexus of fragile States, and lead to the growth of corrupt governments
and officials. 94 Many of these South American cartels are described as
the “greatest organized crime threat to the United States.” 95 Many of
these organizations can, on their own facet, be labeled terrorists. 96 For
example, FARC, and Sendero Luminosos contain paramilitary wings
that create havoc and chaos amongst their countries, villages, and
farmers within. 97 Additionally, “[s]ome traffickers based in the triborder area have ties to radical Islamic terrorist groups such as
Hizballah.” 98
Prior to September 11th, few Americans realized the connection
between drug money and how it has been used to fund terrorism. 99
Besides the obvious concerns of illicit drug trading, narco-terror, and
traditional terror organizations forming relationships in Latin America
pose numerous risks to the United States as well as the globe. One

91.

Id.

92.

See Press Release, Department of Justice, DEA and Giuliani Open
National Museum Exhibit on Drugs and Terrorism (September 3, 2002)
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr090302p.html

93.

See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE ET AL., LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG
PROGRAMS at 1, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/ rpts/
R41215_20100430.pdf

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

For the purpose of this Note, terrorism shall follow the definition set by
Congress for the Secretary of State when preparing the annual country
reports on terrorism: “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004).

97.

SEELKE, supra note 93 at 5.

98.

Edwin Mora, Hezbollah, Hamas Raise Money for ‘Terrorist Activities’
From Drug Trade in South America, Congressional Research Service
Says, CNSNEWS.COM (Jun. 8, 2010), http://cnsnews.com/node/67377.

99.

Fraser, supra note 89.
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such example is the possibility of terrorists being smuggled in via the
Mexican border. 100

III. Current Framework of Counterfeit Medicine
In the United States, numerous agencies act both in unison and
on their own volition to combat counterfeit medicine. While these
agencies act to thwart, and prevent the dissemination of counterfeit
medicine, they also act to promulgate information. 101 One pitfall of a
concert of agencies acting is that “[t]he ‘data’ begins to resemble a
house of mirrors as each group cites the other as the source of the
information.” 102 Before exploring the various levels of action, some
background information is needed. According to the WHO,
counterfeit medicine accounts for nearly 10% of readily available
medicine. 103 One staggering statistic, promulgated by the WHO, posits
$32 billion annual estimated revenue from counterfeit medicines
100. See Feds Warn Of Terrorists Sneaking Into U.S. Through Mexico, JUD.
WATCH BLOG (May 8, 2010), http://www.judicialwatch.org/
blog/2010/05/feds-warn-terrorists-sneaking-through-mexico/ (confirming
that an Al Qaeda terrorist is planning to sneak into the U.S. through
Mexico, and furthering previous statements that Islamic terrorist and
Mexican drug cartels are teaming up to finance terror in the Middle
East and perpetrate attacks against America); see also Joe Wolverton
II, Terrorist Smuggling Into U.S. a Real Concern, NEW AMERICAN (Jul.
30, 2010), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/5961terrorist-smuggling-into-us-a-real-concern (confirming “that aliens with
ties to Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda have been arrested by local law
enforcement and Border Patrol agents while attempting to cross into”
Texas).
101. For example, the FDA and other organizations have online bulletins
listing drugs that are currently recalled or banned, as well as issue Press
Releases stating similar findings. See generally Recalls, Market
Withdrawals, and Safety Alerts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 30,
2015), http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ (providing information on
all drugs with safety concerns and the reasons for the recalls).
102. See Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 525, 528 (2006)
103. See World Health Org., Fact Sheet No. 275, Substandard and
Counterfeit
Medicines
(Nov.
2003),
available
at
http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/ (reporting that the
FDA estimates that 10% of the global medicine market is made up of
counterfeits [hereinafter WHO 275]; see also Press Release, Int’l Council
of Nurses, Nurses Raise the Alarm: Counterfeit Medicines Kill (May 11,
2005), available at http://www.icn.ch/PR09_05.htm [hereinafter Nurses
Raise the Alarm]; see also Press Release, World Health Organization,
WHO and Partners Accelerate Fight Against Counterfeit Medicines,
available
at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/
pr69/en/ [hereinafter WHO Counterfeit Medicine Press Release]
(claiming “Up to 50% of medicines sold through rogue web sites are
fake.”).
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globally. 104 Further promoting this “house of mirrors” 105 attitude is the
problem wherein the FDA cites to the WHO numbers. 106 In 2008, a
publication by the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association indicated counterfeit drugs represent a loss
of over $6 billion in sales per annum. 107 Considering the enormous loss
in sales, combined with the amount of money these illegal
manufacturers are making, foreign and domestic initiatives are
currently in place to stymie both the manufacturing processes as well
as the distribution channels. Domestically, the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative in concert
with private pharmaceutical companies, lead the charge.
Internationally, the WHO and its subsidiary IMPACT attempt to
obstruct the dissemination of these illicit counterfeit pharmaceuticals.
A. Domestic Impediments to Counterfeit Medicine

The United States, due in part to housing fifty-percent of the
world’s leading pharmaceutical companies, is extremely rigorous in
their prevention of counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 108 Led in part by the
U.S.’s strong intellectual property (“IP”) protection, the first defense
against IP infringement is the USTR. 109 Meanwhile, one facet of the
FDA’s mission is, in regards to drugs, medical devices, foods, blood
and biological products, to investigate counterfeiting. 110 Finally, in so
far as public impediments are concerned, the FBI and U.S. Customs
104. WHO Counterfeit Medicine Press Release, supra note 103.
105. Outterson & Smith, supra note 102, at 528.
106. Compare e.g., Counterfeit Drugs Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/qa.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is estimated that upwards of 10% of
drugs worldwide are counterfeit, and in some countries more than 50%
of the drug supply is made up of counterfeit drugs.”), with WHO Fact
Sheet, supra note 103 (“[E]stimates put counterfeits at more than 10%
of the global medicines market.... In some countries, the figure [of
counterfeit medicines consumed in developing countries] is thought to be
as high as 50%.”).
107. Office of The Coordinator For Counterterrorism, supra note 8
108. See Rinu Chacko, Top 10 World’s Largest Pharmaceutical Companies
2013, LIST DOSE (Jun. 29, 2013), http://listdose.com/top-10-worldslargest-pharmaceutical-companies-2013/.
109. See U.S. TRADE REP., http:// www.ustr.gov (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
The USTR consults closely with the United States Congress in
determining its priorities and strategies and consults with the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) to effect this change.
110. See Maria Nelson et. al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide
Problem, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1076 (2006)
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and Border Protection (CBP) contribute in obstructing drug imports
at U.S. borders and within the country. 111
1. The USTR and Counterfeit Medicine

One of the USTR’s most significant tools is the Special 301
Report, which allows the USTSR to issue an annual report specifying
countries that deny effective protection of IP rights or deny access to
information regarding IP rights. 112 The power to issue this 301 Report
is conferred unto the USTR by Congress. 113 In order to provide the
most effective guidance, the USTR designates the most egregious
offenders as “priority” countries. 114 Under the Act, “priority” is
defined as:
[T]hose foreign countries - (A) that have the most onerous or
egregious acts, policies, or practices that (i) deny adequate and
effective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny fair and
equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon
intellectual property protection, (B) whose acts, policies, or
practices described in subparagraph (A) have the greatest
adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant United
States products, and (C) that are not (i) entering into good
faith negotiations, or (ii) making significant progress in bilateral
or multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights. 115

This designation is particularly important as being designated a
priority “warns a country of U.S. concerns and also warns companies
based in the United States, or other developed countries that intend
to do business abroad, that their intellectual property rights are not
likely to be satisfactorily protected.” 116 Additionally, a label of priority
is used to pressure non-complying countries to adopt stricter IP
111. Id.
112. See The Work of USTR, Intellectual Property, U.S. TRADE REP. (Jul. 8,
2004), http://www.ustr.gov/ Trade_Sectors/ Intellectual_Property/
The_Work_ of_USTR_-_Intellectual_Property.html.
113. For more information see generally 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (stating that the
USTR must by April 30 of each year: “identify (1) those foreign
countries that (A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights, or (B) deny fair and equitable markets access to United
States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, and (2)
those foreign countries identified under paragraph (1) that are
determined by the Trade Representative to be priority foreign
countries.”)
114. Id.
115. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b).
116. Nelson, supra note 110, at 1075.
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protection, and ultimately compliance with the USTR’s goals. 117
Another program the USTR has instituted to thwart counterfeiting is
the “Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy” (or “STOP!”) Initiative. 118
Under STOP!, the USTR works to dismantle criminal enterprises that
steal IP by empowering law enforcement authorities (FBI, Police, U.S.
Attorneys, District Attorneys) to arrest and prosecute offenders. 119
As mentioned previously, the work of the USTR is just one aspect
in a multi-faceted domestic approach to thwart counterfeit medicine,
and ultimately terrorism via counterfeit medicine.
2. The FDA and Counterfeit Medicine

Responding to the evolving problem of counterfeit drugs, the
FDA created a mechanism for thwarting counterfeiting – the result
was the creation of an FDA Counterfeit Drug Task Force. 120 Through
the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations, the FDA has taken a
proactive stance on identifying the component suppliers thereby
availing themselves the opportunity to seize the counterfeit drugs
prior to their reaching consumers. 121 The FDA estimates that for
every dollar a consumer spends, twenty-five cents are investigated by
the FDA-OCI. 122 Recently, the FDA proposed new measures to
protect the nation’s food supply. 123 These rules stem from the Food

117. See generally Eric H. Smith, Copyright Industries Urge Greater Global
Protection of American Jobs and Exports Threatened by Piracy, INT’L
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.iipa.com/
pdf/IIPASpecial3012010SubmissionPressReleaseFinal011810.pdf.
118. See STOP Initiative Targets Piracy, Counterfeit Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Oct. 4, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Oct/05501889.html; see also Trade Remedy Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM., http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 17, 2014).
119. STOP Initiative, supra note 118.
120. See FDA, COMBATING COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 2 (2004), available at
http:// www.fda.gov/counterfeit/.
121. See Combating Counterfeit Drugs: A Report of The Food and Drug
Administration Annual Update, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (May 18,
2005), http:// www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/update2005.html.
For more information on where the FDA derives its investigative power
see 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (1996), 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2013), 18 U.S.C. § 2320
(2012).
122. See Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/
ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm123062.htm.
123. See Focused Mitigation Strategies To Protect Food Against Intentional
Adulteration, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/ articles/
2013/12/24/2013-30373/focused-mitigation-strategies-to-protect-foodagainst-intentional-adulteration; see also Lynne Terry, FDA Proposes
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Safety Modernization Act that President Obama signed in 2011. 124 Its
purpose is to in part, require large food plants to have a defense plan
to protect vulnerabilities in their processing apparatus. 125 This is
significant as this protects against an area in which terrorists can
assault vis-á-vis attacking the general populous.
3. The FBI and U.S. Customs and Counterfeit Medicine

Switching from regulatory and supply constraints to a more active
and engaged role yields the actions of the FBI and U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol (“CBP”). In regards to the CBP, their role in
preventing counterfeit medicine, and terrorism, is attempting to
thwart wrongdoers at the border. One way CBP thwarts wrongdoers
is by analyzing all shipments for copyright/trademarks. By requiring
this recordation, in conjunction with U.S. law, which requires owners
of copyrights and trademarks record their rights, CBP officials can
seize pirated or counterfeit goods at the borders. 126 While CBP is
charged with preventing smuggling at the border, once these nefarious
counterfeit products have entered the country the FBI is charged with
sourcing them, and arresting the individuals involved. 127 In this
capacity, their mission is to protect the public from the threat of
these fake medications. 128 In their joint task force responsibilities, the
FBI works closely with the WTO, FDA, and others, which has
allegedly yielded a deterrent effect regarding the exploitation of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. In addition to working with foreign
services, the FBI also works closely with local, and international, law
enforcement to thwart would be criminals. 129

Food Safety Rule to Thwart Terrorism, OR. LIVE (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.oregonlive.com/health/index.ssf/2013/12/fda_proposed_fo
od_safety_rule.html.
124. See generally 21 U.S.C §§ 301–399.
125. Terry, supra note 123.
126. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.1 et seq., Customs Duties; Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, Dep’t of Homeland Security; Dep’t of the Treasury;
Trademarks, Trade Names, and Copyrights. 19 C.F.R. § 133.22,
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing copying or simulating
trademarks, subsection (b), for instance, allows for denial of entry of any
“articles of foreign or domestic manufacture imported into the United
States bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded mark
or name” (emphasis added).
127. See ALBERT L. WERTHEIMER ET. AL, COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: POLICY,
ECONOMICS, AND COUNTERMEASURES 61 (2012).
128. Id.
129. See Press Release, FBI, Two Pakistani Nationals Indicted for
Conspiring to Illegally Ship Pharmaceuticals into the U.S. (Nov. 7,
2012) http://www.fbi.gov/ washingtondc/ press-releases/ 2012/two-
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From the comprehensive analysis above, it appears the U.S. has
an elaborate grasp on the counterfeit medicine problem. In reality,
while the structure seems stable and concrete, it fails to address the
more pressing issue – preventing the production and exploitation of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals by international terror organizations.

IV. Critique of Current Framework of Counterfeit
Medicine and Solution
While the United States and International partners theoretically
have an elaborate network of processes and agencies designed to
prevent the promulgation of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, the reality is
that most of the work occurs on U.S. soil. Though this ultimately
protects the end-user, it fails to eradicate the source. Another key
dilemma is the lack of a true coordinated effort to thwart this process.
INTERPOL, IMPACT, FDA, and FBI task forces liaise between one
another – which purportedly yields the sharing of data and vital
mission planning. Until the U.S. and the rest of the world rid the
“house of mirrors” concern, the prevention of the War Through
Pharmaceuticals will continue to vastly lag behind the War on
Terror. In this section, this Note will propose a solution to help fix
this difficulty.
The international community, through a coordinated effort, can
effectively prevent the dissemination of counterfeit pharmaceuticals.
This proposal features two interdependent facets – an international
task force, and an international database – that, in unison create an
extremely effective solution to an extremely expensive and dangerous
problem. 130
A. International Task Force

One of the key difficulties surrounding IMPACT, and other
international solutions, is the absence of a true enforcement
apparatus. 131 In the United States, and many countries around the
pakistani-nationals-indicted-for-conspiring-to-illegally-shippharmaceuticals-into-the-u.s
130. SEELKE, supra note 93, at 1.
131. See George F. Will, Opinion, The Perils of “Legality,” NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 10, 1990, at 66 (exclaiming “[i]f international law is really law,
who enacts, construes, adjudicates and enforces it? The phrase
“international law” often is virtually an oxymoron. Law without a sword
is mere words: lacking an enforcement mechanism soi-disant “law” is
merely admonition or aspiration. Law must be backed by coercion
legitimatized by a political process.”) Cf. James G. Apple, Enforcement
Of International Law Is Not Dependent On A “Sword” Or Enforcement
Mechanism, AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. & INT’L JUD. ACAD. (2007)
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_0207/generalprinciples.html.
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world, laws are obeyed because failure to abide leads to penalty—
typically arrest or in the case of civil violations, fines; while
internationally there is the pressure of the international community to
contemplate, which may on its own pose a great enough stigma to
deter behavior. 132 Unfortunately, IMPACT, in its current formation,
merely acts in an advisory manner. 133 Through IMPACT’s
coordinated networks, agencies, in theory, act as one. The problem
tends to be a lack of systematic coordination. While IMPACT and its
partners’ actions produce interception of contraband, they are not
proactive in attacking or raiding the sites where terrorists harvest and
make the counterfeits. 134 This Note focuses on the creation of an
international Taskforce to seek out and prevent the terrorists from
either attacking pharmaceutical production, or producing counterfeits
before they are shipped. This Note is not meant as a scathing critique
of IMPACT, but merely a renovation of a stable foundation, that if
implemented, will yield to greater results in preventing terrorists from
producing counterfeit medicine.
In order to effectively staff this standing task force, the United
Nations Security Council must authorize the action. 135 While there
will invariably be some dissent, due to the severe nature of this
problem, all countries will ultimately agree this is necessary. 136 One of
the principal cornerstones of the United Nations is international
132. See generally 2013 USSC GUIDELINES MANUAL, http://www.ussc.gov/
Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/index.cfm (detailing all the federal
sentencing guidelines and their rationales).
133. See IMPACT, supra note 5.
134. See BRIAN D. FINLEY, COUNTERFEIT DRUGS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 12
(2011) (stating that “[g]overnments should be more proactive… from a
public health perspective, as well as from a national security
standpoint.”).
135. See U.N. Charter art. 41; see also, e.g., Preparatory Process to Develop
the Terms of Reference for the UN Interagency Task Force on NCDs,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 2011), http://www.who.int/ nmh/events/
ncd_task_force/en/ and Press Release, World Health Org., UN to
Establish WHO-led Interagency Task Force on the Prevention and
Control of NCDs (22 July, 2013), available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/notes/2013/ncds_ecosoc_20130722/en/ (discussing
the United Nations establishing a joint task force on the Prevention and
Control of NCDs.)
136. See Michelle Nichols, Russia, China veto U.N. Security Council
resolution on Syria, REUTERS (Jul. 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/07/19/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719; see also
Peter James Spielmann, Russia Holding Security Council ‘Hostage,’
Power says, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/
news/ world/ 2013/ 09/ 05/ russia-holding-security-council-hostagepower-says-russia-holding-hostage-syria-power-says/
6Ie7i5M0sTlD0dY0SIqLkO/story.html.
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cooperation. 137 The ability to depend on this body of Nations for swift
and just action has, on numerous occasions, led to a multitude of
cooperation and resolutions that have not only stymied war, but also
created new countries, and protected the rights of countless
unrepresented minorities. 138 The proposal calls for a U.N. Security
Council resolution authorizing the standing use of force for a
dedicated mission. 139 That mission will be the neutralization and
systematic targeting of terror organizations focused on counterfeiting
and pharmaceuticals. 140
In theory, this new task force – affectionately labeled the Medical
Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force (MACT) – will act as an autonomous
asymmetrical unit. In analogizing this proposed unit, the model will
be similar to that of the International Anti-Poaching Foundation
(“IAPF”). The IAPF acts akin to a structured military-like battalion,
employing modern technology to fend off violent poachers. 141 The sole
mission of the IAPF is to protect wild life reserves in the African from

137. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (stating that the main purposes of the
United Nations are “international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”).
138. See e.g. G.A. Res. 67/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/262 (May 15, 2013)
(addressing “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.”); see also G.A.
Res. 47/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/147 (condemning “the [s]ituation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”); see also G.A.
Res. 47/145 & 47/146, U.N. Docs. A/RES/47/145 & A/RES/47/146
(condemning “the [s]ituation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran” and “the situation of human rights in Iraq.”); see also G.A. Res.
181(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947) (recommending “to
the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all
other Members of the United Nations the adoption and
implementation… [of] the Plan of Partition [for Palestine].”).
139. Under Art. 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council can authorize
force when they determine “the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and in accordance with Art.
42 “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary.” See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.
140. Previously, the Security Council has authorized force for use against
Iraq, among other occasions. See e.g., S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing use of “all necessary means” to
uphold S.C. Res. 660 demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, as well
as numerous subsequent resolutions enacted to ensure the restoration of
peace within this area) and S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr.
3, 1991) (having been cited as recently as 2001 to authorize force against
Iraq for failure to abide by the conditions precedent).
141. About the IAPF, INT’L ANTI-POACHING FOUND. http://www.iapf.org/
en/about (last visited March 16, 2014). See also Damien Mander, Rise
of the Drones, AFR. GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2013), http://www.iapf.org/
images/documents/riseofthedronesjan2013.pdf.
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poachers. 142 The IAPF is a remarkable model to analogize this task
force to, though it is a private non-profit. 143 In seeking funding for this
recommended task force, one possible avenue is a public-private
model. 144 Currently, the WHO estimates that pharmaceutical
companies lose $75 billion per year due to counterfeit
pharmaceuticals. 145 Though some have security forces to cease illegal
mills’ production, relinquishing this expenditure to multinational force
would allow for a more effective handling of the issue, and thus the
likely possibility that the total loss will drastically be diminished. 146
Much like the IAPF, this taskforce should have both a central
location, as well as various locations “in theatre.” 147 The central
location should be located on a current military installation (AfriCom
and CentCom for example) and be pre-loaded with the top Special
Forces soldiers that countries make available. 148 The use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (“UAV”) can also aide and assist the taskforce.149 In
142. Id. (noting the groups motto is “To protect and preserve wildlife in
volatile regions.”).
143. See A Rhino and a Gun, THUMBS UP AFR., http:// www.
thumbsupafrica.org/program/program-2/iapf.html (last visited March
14, 2014.)
144. See Technology Partnership, UNITED NATIONS, http:// www.
unfoundation.org/what-we-do/campaigns-and-initiatives/mobiletechnology/technology-partnership.html (last visited March 14, 2014)
(explaining that through the public-private partnership, and donation of
Ted Turner, mobile technology is able to be given to those in developing
countries to “play a vital role in developing solutions”).
145. See Eric Palmer, Top Counterfeit Drug Events in 2012, FIERCEPHARMA
(October 10, 2012), http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/topcounterfeit-drug-events-2012. Cf. HEMA VITHLANI, THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING 17 (1997) (estimating that in 1997,
legitimate losses may be as high as $17 billion).
146. See Carl Quintanilla, War on Counterfeit Goods, CNBC (Original air
date: July 14th, 2010.), http://www.cnbc.com/id/37824347/; see e.g.,
LEV RATNOVSKI, COMPETITION POLICY FOR MODERN BANKS 3 (2013)
(explaining that the IMF is more effective at lending to underdeveloped
and developing countries [Crisis Lending] than traditional banking
structures).
147. English Definition of “Theatre,” CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/ british/ theatre_4 (last
visited March 14, 2014).
148. Besides United States Tier 1 operators, British SAS, German GSG9,
Polish GROM, and French GIGN soldiers, and veterans, should be
recruited to carry out these missions. For a more exhaustive list, see
Top Ten Special Operations Forces in the World, ARMED FORCES
HISTORY MUSEUM,
http://armedforcesmuseum.com/top-ten-specialoperations-forces-in-the-world/ (last visited March 14, 2014).
149. See Mander, supra note 141.
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using these asymmetric warfare capabilities, it will give the UN
taskforce a much-needed advantage over these terror cells harvesting
and planning on tampering with pharmaceuticals. 150 The benefits and
advantages of such a task force are numerous, but succinctly, it allows
for greater outreach and the ability to be proactive in this action
against counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Much like joint task forces have
been successful in their various UN uses, these task forces have also
been beneficial in the war against terror. 151
The efficacy of current task forces provides optimism for the
effective use of this unit. 152 Unlike IMPACT, which acts purely in an
advisory manner, this task force would work in a preemptive
manner. 153 The addition of this task force does not preclude the use of
IMPACT, but – much like the spirit of the UN – would be a further
cooperative angle designed to thwart terrorist organizations from
producing, marketing, and selling counterfeit medicine. 154 Further,
IMPACT has failed to yield any newsworthy results since Operation
Pangea, in 2011. 155 While commendable, Operation Pangea failed to
prevent the production and dissemination of these counterfeit
medicines, but rather – through Internet Service Providers (ISP), and
Customs Officials – seized the drugs upon their arrival, and shut
150. Id.
151. See Press Release, United Nations, United Nations-African Union Joint
Task Force on Peace and Security Holds Third Consultative Meeting in
New York (Sept. 26, 2011) available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2011/afr2254.doc.htm; see also JENA BAKER MCNEILL
ET
AL.
39 TERROR PLOTS FOILED SINCE 9/11: EXAMINING
COUNTERTERRORISM’S SUCCESS STORIES ABSTRACT (2011).
152. See, e.g., Select Achievements in 2008-2009, U.N. REG. TASK FORCE ON
INJECTING DRUG USE & HIV/AIDS FOR ASIA & PACIFIC, https://www.
unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/topics/hiv-and-aids/unrtf.html#4
(last visited March 14, 2014) (exclaiming the Task Force’s numerous
accomplishments including: Collaboration and support to legal and
policy reviews by the HIV/AIDS Asia Regional Program (HAARP)
supported by AusAID, and Issuance of a document: Step-by-Step
Algorithm for the Procurement of Controlled Substances for Drug
Substitution).
153. See IMPACT, supra note 5.
154. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (stating that the main purposes of the
United Nations are “international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”).
155. See Press Release, Interpol, Global Operation Strikes at Online Supply
of Illegal and Counterfeit Medicines Worldwide (September 29, 2011)
available at http://www.interpol.int/ News-and-media/ News/2011/
PR081 (stating that through a campaign to prevent the prevalence of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals being sold online, IMPACT and
INTERPOL have shut down websites and learned valuable information
to effectively prevent the sale of counterfeit drugs online.)
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down the conduits (websites). 156 This approach is far from effective, as
exemplified by the lack of progress since 2011. While a task force is an
extraordinary improvement from the status quo, it alone will not
properly facilitate the end of this pandemic. Thus, in addition to the
newly created task force, IMPACT’s focus will shift to the
establishment of an international database of pharmaceutical drugs
currently being counterfeited, the suspected parties involved in the
operation and identifying where the funding is coming from and being
diverted. The creation of this database will be used as a guide for
MACT to pinpoint, with surgical precision, attacks aimed at
disrupting and terminating this counterfeit production.
B. International Database, Regulation, and the Adoption of a Treaty
Making the Production of Counterfeit Medicine a Crime.

Through IMPACT’s mission statement, its operation is to
construct coordinated international networks to halt the production,
and sale of counterfeit medicine. 157 While continuing to promulgate
rules, advisory opinions, and white papers on counterfeit medicine,
under this proposal, IMPACT will be tasked with compiling,
maintaining, and promulgating to MACT the database. The purpose
of this database is to furnish to both MACT as well as the major
anti-counterfeiting players, a timely database consisting of
pharmaceutical drugs currently being counterfeited, the suspected
parties involved in the operation and identifying where the funding is
coming from and being diverted. 158 In theory, this database will be
similar to United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization’s (UNESCO) International and National databases of
“Illicit Trafficking of Stolen Property,” or the United Nations Office
of Drugs and Crime’s Electronic Legal Resources on International
Terrorism 159 The UNESCO Database allows for aggrieved parties to
report stolen Art – equipped with photos and detailed information of
the piece – on an Interpol based database. 160 In its iteration as an art

156. See id.
157. See IMPACT, supra note 5.
158. Id. (explaining that the “players” include “international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, enforcement agencies, pharmaceutical
manufacturers associations and drug and regulatory authorities”).
159. See e.g., Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property, U.N. ED., SCI. & CULT’L
ORG., http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-traffic-ofcultural-property/databases/ (last visited March 14, 2014). See also
Electronic Legal Resources on International Terrorism, UNODC,
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/ (last visited March 14, 2014).
160. See e.g., Bearded Man, INTERPOL, http:// www.interpol.int/ notice/
search/woa/1185172 (last visited March 14, 2014).
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database, individual countries also have website based databases for
individuals to report stolen art and seek aide in having it returned. 161
While borrowing the form from UNESCO’s database,
pharmaceutical companies, as well as national organizations (FBI,
Masad, local police departments, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
etc.), and international groups (WHO, IMPACT, Interpol) can
update this database upon their findings. 162 Ideally, it would provide a
form that would allow for key descriptors to be provided. These
descriptors would items such as: location of seizure, description of pill
(size, color, legible text or identifying marks), origin, group
responsible, and suspected location of production facility. In the spirit
of international cooperation and coordination, this data would be
securely stored on Interpol’s servers, and transmitted to the task force
to provide real time updates as to the location of counterfeit
production. From this, the task force could launch preemptive strikes
and coordinate with sovereign territories as to how to effectively
negotiate the jurisdictional boundaries often present in international
endeavors. Access to submit to the database would be open to
credentialed individuals, with credentials being made possible after
proof of affiliation in the aforementioned list of individuals. As
previously mentioned, administration, and funding would be made
possible through IMPACT and the WHO’s budget, as well as
voluntary contributions. 163 It would be encouraged for individual
country’s to have their lead investigative assembly (for example the
FBI in the United States) have sub-databases at their level where
users could post and they could vet prior to uploading to the
international database. While this may seem like a detailed process,
and in effect it is, it has proven to be of assistance. 164 As illustrated on
161. See e.g., L’Office Centrale de Lutte Contre le Trafic des Biens Culturels
[Central Office for the Fight Against Traffic in Cultural Goods], POLICE
NATIONALE
[FRENCH
NATIONAL
POLICE]
(Dec.
13,
2011),
http://www.police-nationale.interieur.gouv.fr/Organisation/DirectionCentrale-de-la-Police-Judiciaire/Lutte-contre-la-criminalite-organisee/
Office-central-de-lutte-contre-le-trafic-de-biens-culturels (Fr.); National
Stolen Art File , FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/
vc_majorthefts/arttheft/national-stolen-art-file.
162. See e.g., Bearded Man, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/ notice/
search/woa/1185172 (last visited March 14, 2014).
163. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRAMME BUDGET 2012-2013 82–83 (2012)
[hereinafter WHO Budget], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
pb/2012-2013/PB_2012–2013_eng.pdf.
164. See e.g., Recent Restitution Cases of Cultural Objects Using the 1970
Convention, UNESCO, http:// www. unesco.org/ new/en/culture/
themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/recent-restitution-cases-ofcultural-objects-using-the-1970-convention/ (last visited March 14,
2014).
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the UNESCO website, there are many cases of individuals, and
countries, having their lost art returned to them. 165
The next component is increased regulation. IMPACT has already
undertaken a massive campaign against counterfeit online sales of
drugs, but this action needs to be further expanded to properly
account for terrorist organizations. 166 Following in the action of the
Customs and Border Patrol, other countries should place Import
Alerts on drugs from countries listed in the database. 167 Doing so will
have a multi-faceted effect. First, Import Alerts trigger mandatory
searching and testing of drugs. Second, this will have an undesirable
economic effect on the origin country. 168 Finally, United States
Customs and Border Patrol, along with their international
counterparts, should flag medicine from countries known to harbor,
produce, and ship counterfeit medicine produced from terrorist
organizations. By crosschecking with the aforementioned database, a
wide array of countries can be listed which will yield to further
descriptors to add to the aforementioned database. 169
The final approach is the creation of a Treaty, which promulgates
stringent rules and definitions for which countries must abide. As one
author noted, if a crime amounts to an offence against the
international community at large, or sans international cooperation
the crime will further persevere, then said crime should be considered
an international crime. 170 In this situation, it is increasingly apparent
165. See Other Cases of Return or Restitution of Cultural Objects, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-ofcultural-property/other-cases-of-return-or-restitution-of-cultural-objects/
(last visited March 14, 2014); Recent Restitution Cases of Cultural
Objects Using the 1970 Convention, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/
new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/recentrestitution-cases-of-cultural-objects-using-the-1970-convention/(last
visited March 14, 2014) (explaining that objects both in accordance with
the 1970 convention, as well as outside the province of that document,
were returned to their owners).
166. See Operations, INTERPOL, http:// www. interpol. int/Crime-areas/
Pharmaceutical-crime/Operations/Operation-Pangea (last visited March
14, 2014) (explaining the efficacy of Operation Pangea).
167. See Import Alert, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// www. fda. gov/
Forindustry/ ImportProgram/ ImportAlerts/default.htm (last visited
March 14, 2014) (explaining what Import Alerts are, and allowing for
access to a current list of Alerts).
168. See BRYAN A. LIANG, PIGS, DRUGS, AND TERRORISTS 12, http://
safemeds.typepad.com/files/pigs-drugs-and-terrorists.pdf (last visited
March 14, 2014) (explaining that by placing an Import Alert, all drugs
from that country will be stopped and subject to exhaustive testing).
169. See supra sec. IV(A)(2).
170. See M.C. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of International
Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, at 28-29 (1983).
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that individual countries cannot singlehandedly prosecute offenders,
thus, it should be considered an international crime. 171 Finally, the
Declaration of Rome held that counterfeiting medicines is “widespread
and has escalated to such an extent that effective coordination and
cooperation at the international level are necessary for regional and
national strategies to be more effective.” 172
As numerous treaties have previously specified international
crimes, using these prior treaties, and applying them towards
counterfeit medicine, is a worthwhile cause. 173 The first step in
determining the language of a Treaty would be a consensus on the
impropriety, followed by a definition of counterfeit medicine. 174 Using
the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting
Currency, the following would most likely be accepted as universal
acts falling under the purview of counterfeit medicine:
(i) the manufacturing or preparation of counterfeit medicine;
(ii) the provision or possession of equipment, instruments or
ingredients used in the manufacturing or preparation of
counterfeit medicine;
(iii) the sale, offering for sale, dispatch, transportation, and
import or export of counterfeit medicine, or equipment or
ingredients used in the manufacturing or preparation of
counterfeit medicine;
(iv) the falsification of documents in relation to a counterfeit
medicine or its ingredients;
171. See Amir Attaran et al., Why and How to Make an International Crime
of Medicine Counterfeiting, 9 J INT’L CRIM. JUST. 325, 327 (2011).
172. See Declaration of Rome, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
WHO International Conference on Combating Counterfeit Medicines, at
Section 4, available at http://www.who.int/medicines/ services/
counterfeit/RomeDeclaration.pdf (last visited March 14, 2014)
(declaring, inter alia, “Counterfeiting medicines… is a vile and serious
criminal offence; Combating counterfeit medicines requires the
coordinated effort of all the different public and private stakeholders;
[and] Counterfeiting medicines is widespread and has escalated to such
an extent that effective coordination and cooperation at the
international level are necessary for regional and national strategies to
be more effective.”).
173. See e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105; (delineating hijacking aircraft as an
international crime). See also Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs,
520 UNTS 204; as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 976 UNTS 3; (demarcating trafficking
narcotics as an international crime). See also International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
174. Attaran et al., supra note 171, at 334–35.

372

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
War Through Pharmaceuticals
(v) the entering into a conspiracy to commit, or the making of
an attempt to commit, or the aiding, abetting, facilitating, or
counseling to commit, any of the foregoing offences. 175

The final element in drafting the Treaty is the inclusion of mens
rea or intent. While many laws specifically articulate the culpable
intent, in this case—as all of the elements deal with counterfeit
medicine—it may be more prudent to include the mens rea
requirement in the definition. 176 Regarding the definition of counterfeit
medicine, in keeping with the prior used definition – promulgated by
the WHO, but with slight modification for mens rea – for the purpose
of the Treaty shall be: “fake medicine[, that] may be contaminated or
contain the wrong or no active ingredient,” which is intentionally
mislabeled or knowingly identified as that unto which it is not. 177 The
Treaty will undoubtedly face scrutiny from member-nations in
approving and ratifying the law in their nation, but as explained
previously, the Treaty merely adopts pre-existing language, and crafts
it for counterfeit medicine, thus alleviating some of the concern many
member-nations may have. 178

IV. Conclusion
The issue of counterfeit medicine has surpassed the ability to
contain, and yields an immensely profitable result for terrorists.179
Terror organizations have eclipsed the age of narcotic smuggling, and
traditional financing, and have transcended in to an era of
sophisticated counterfeit medicine trafficking to gain an advantage
over authorities and groups looking to obstruct them. 180 The WHO
estimates counterfeit medicine has surpassed a $75 billion industry, in
which some is directed towards terror organizations bank accounts.181
While the international community has known about this problem for
some time, an effective solution – until now – has yet to be proposed,
or enacted. When countries on their own cannot enact change, it
should be the responsibility of the internationally community to act,
in concert, and provide what the singular country cannot.
175. Id.at 335.
176. See id.
177. See Counterfeit Medicine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafel
y/CounterfeitMedicine/default.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
178. Attaran et al., supra note 172, at 352–53.
179. See THREATS WATCH, supra note 3.
180. See WASH. INST., supra note 1.
181. Palmer, supra note 145.
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In proposing, and evaluating a solution, this Note examined the
actions of two groups – Hizballah, and the Real IRA – and exposed
the lesser known counterfeit medicine production that they have
previously and, in some cases, continue to employ to raise their funds.
Next, an analysis of the complex issue of terror financing was
explored. In examining how terrorist organizations fundraise, several
methods are employed to raise funds that traditionally, were much
easier to procure. 182 Of the most common, charities are no longer the
easiest method for terror organizations to traffic illicit money into for
their activity. 183 In the last decade, nearly $200 million in terrorist
funds were seized or frozen, and the U.S., in concert with 36 other
countries, organized the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (“FATF”) to further combat terrorist organizations from
laundering their criminal gains. 184 Countries such as the United States,
have attempted to take action via domestic agencies such as the
FDA, FBI, and the JTTF. While their effort should be commended,
this effort fails to actively disrupt an activity that has the possibility
to kill millions. 185 In the international community, little has been done
– once again – to proactively seek or disrupt these production
facilities. 186 While white papers have been written, and missions have
been waged against online retailers and at Customs offices, a
systematic failure to be proactive has led to the rise of an industry
that has been condoned by religious zealots and their leaders for use
only on Western infidels, and non-Shiite believers. 187 The only way to
truly neutralize terrorist organizations from producing counterfeit
medicine, and thus funding their illicit activity, is a proactive taskforce melded with a world-wide, constantly updated database, and an
international treaty providing countries and their courts with the
authority to strike, seize, and sentence infringing individuals for their
offenses. A properly produced a task-force should be molded after the
IAPF in that it should consist of special forces soldiers, trained in
asymmetric warfare and advanced combat techniques. 188 The
accompanying database should be modeled after the UNESCO Art

182. Kaplan, supra note 75.
183. Id.
184. Statement of Secretary Paul O’Neill, supra note 25. FATF, supra note
27.
185. Attaran et al., supra note 172, at 330–31.
186. See Operations, INTERPOL, supra note 167.
187. Hezbollah Manufacturing Counterfeit Medicine, CLARION PROJECT (Sept.
11, 2012), http:// www. clarionproject. org/ news/ hezbollahmanufacturing-counterfeit-medicine.
188. Mander, supra note 141.
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databases for both ease of use, and effectiveness. 189 Allowing
governmental agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental agencies to upload their findings to the database,
provides the task-force instant feedback on the location, terrorist
organization, and magnitude of their operation. IMPACT, through
their WHO mandate shall be responsible for operating and ensuring
proper connectivity with Interpol and their servers. In furthering the
global knowledge of counterfeit medicine and specific drugs’
whereabouts, Customs officials should produce an Import Alert on all
items from countries known to harbor production facilities for
counterfeit medicine. 190 Finally, to assist the international community
in prosecuting these terrorists, a Treaty should be adopted, which
both sets out the elements of the crime for producing counterfeit
medicine, and also defines what counterfeit medicine is. 191 Effectively
setting forth these four principles, this Note proposes a solution,
which should both garner the support of the international community,
and frustrate the uncivilized attacks of terrorist organizations by
disrupting their financing regimes.
“Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international
behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective
retribution.” – Ronald Reagan. 192

189. Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property, supra note 159.
190. LIANG, supra note 168.
191. Attaran et al., supra note 172, at 335.
192. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, Remarks at
the Welcoming Ceremony for the Freed American Hostages (Jan. 27,
1981).
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